How many internet shutdowns were documented in 2025?

The #KeepItOn coalition documented 313 shutdowns worldwide in 2025, making it the worst year on record for internet freedom.

Which specific tools were most commonly targeted by governments?

VPN services, Telegram, and Signal were among the primary targets, with countries like Venezuela and Belarus specifically blocking these tools to suppress dissent.

What is the difference between a broad internet shutdown and a targeted block?

A broad shutdown cuts off internet access entirely, while a targeted block restricts specific apps or services, such as encrypted messaging apps or VPNs, leaving much of the internet functional.

Why do governments prefer targeting privacy tools over broad internet shutdowns?

Targeted blocking of privacy tools is more precise and avoids the widespread economic disruption and international attention that broad shutdowns attract, while still limiting dissidents' and journalists' ability to communicate privately.

Why are VPN services blocked alongside encrypted messaging apps?

The two technologies serve related purposes: encrypted messaging apps protect the content of communications, while VPNs can protect access to the platforms themselves, making both targets in efforts to control information flow.

2025 Was the Worst Year for Internet Freedom

A coalition tracking internet shutdowns has released findings that paint a stark picture of global connectivity: 2025 was the worst year on record for internet freedom. The #KeepItOn coalition documented 313 shutdowns worldwide, with a particularly alarming trend emerging: governments are no longer just cutting off the internet broadly. They are now targeting the specific tools people use to work around those cuts.

VPN services, Telegram, and Signal were among the primary targets. Countries including Venezuela and Belarus are identified in the report as intentionally blocking these tools as part of coordinated efforts to suppress dissent and control information flow.

What an Internet Shutdown Actually Looks Like

The term "internet shutdown" can sound abstract, but the reality is concrete and disruptive. Shutdowns range from complete national blackouts to surgical blocks on specific platforms or services. The latter is increasingly common and, in some ways, more insidious.

When a government blocks a specific app like Signal or Telegram, it is not just cutting off a communication channel. It is targeting the layer of privacy those tools provide. Encrypted messaging apps are used by journalists, activists, opposition groups, and ordinary citizens who have reason to believe their communications are monitored. Blocking them is a direct move against private communication itself.

VPN services face the same treatment. Because VPNs can route traffic through servers in other countries, they have historically allowed users to access blocked content. Governments aware of this have invested in technology to detect and block VPN traffic, sometimes with considerable success. The #KeepItOn report makes clear that this cat-and-mouse dynamic is intensifying, and that states are becoming more sophisticated in their blocking capabilities.

Why Governments Target These Tools Specifically

The pattern of targeting VPNs and encrypted apps reveals something important about what governments fear. Broad shutdowns are blunt instruments that disrupt economic activity, anger the business community, and attract international attention. Targeted blocking of privacy tools is more precise: it reduces the ability of dissidents and journalists to organize and communicate, while leaving enough of the internet functional to avoid widespread backlash.

Venezuela and Belarus are not isolated cases. The report documents this approach across multiple regions and political contexts. What they share is a recognition that controlling information flow during moments of political tension, elections, or civil unrest requires disrupting the tools that make private, censorship-resistant communication possible.

This also explains why VPN blocking has become a priority alongside messaging app restrictions. The two technologies serve related purposes: one protects the content of communication, the other can protect access to the platforms where that communication happens. Together, they represent a meaningful obstacle to state surveillance and censorship, which is precisely why they are targeted.

What This Means For You

For most readers in countries with open internet access, 313 shutdowns may feel distant. But the infrastructure and political logic behind these restrictions is worth understanding, for several reasons.

First, internet freedom is not static. Countries that currently allow relatively open access have, in various cases, implemented temporary restrictions during elections or civil unrest. The tools and justifications used in Belarus or Venezuela are available to any government willing to deploy them.

Second, the targeting of VPNs and encrypted messaging represents a broader challenge to privacy as a concept. When states invest in blocking privacy tools, they are making a policy statement about who should have access to private communication. That conversation affects norms globally, not just in the countries where shutdowns are occurring.

Third, for anyone with personal, professional, or journalistic connections to affected regions, understanding the current state of access is practically important. Communication with contacts in countries experiencing shutdowns may be unreliable or monitored, and the channels that worked previously may no longer function.

It is also worth noting what the report implies about the limits of technical solutions. VPNs and encrypted apps are documented as targets precisely because they work, to a degree, but also because they can be blocked. No single tool offers guaranteed protection against a determined state actor with sophisticated blocking infrastructure.

Takeaways

The #KeepItOn coalition documented 313 internet shutdowns in 2025, the highest number on record.
Governments including Venezuela and Belarus are specifically targeting VPN services and encrypted messaging apps like Telegram and Signal.
Targeted blocking of privacy tools is increasingly preferred over broad shutdowns because it is more precise and generates less economic disruption.
VPNs and encrypted messaging can be, and are being, detected and blocked by state-level actors. They reduce risk but do not eliminate it.
Internet freedom conditions can change quickly. Staying informed about access conditions in regions relevant to your work or personal connections is a practical step.
Supporting organizations that document and advocate against internet shutdowns, such as #KeepItOn, contributes to the broader public record on these restrictions.

The weaponisation of the internet described in this report is not a distant technical problem. It reflects deliberate political choices about who gets to communicate, with whom, and under what conditions. Understanding the scope and methods of these shutdowns is a starting point for engaging seriously with what internet freedom actually requires.