New reports describe an Iran Russia Great Firewall copycat trend: both governments are restructuring their national internet systems to isolate citizens and suppress dissent. The reporting, which originated as an opinion piece in The Hill, is brief on technical detail, so this post explains what the approach means in practice, using what is known from the source and from earlier vpn.social coverage. Where details are not established in the source, we say so rather than guess.

How Iran and Russia are copying the Great Firewall

China's Great Firewall is the best-known example of a state filtering what its citizens can reach online. The core idea is simple: instead of treating the internet as one open network, a government controls the points where domestic traffic meets the outside world, then blocks or throttles what it does not approve.

According to the reporting, Iran and Russia are now building comparable systems. The common features described are limits on foreign platforms and VPNs, paired with support for government-friendly domestic services. The aim is a more controlled and isolated online environment, with less room for citizens to organize, share information, or reach outside sources.

The two countries are not taking identical paths. Iran has leaned on tiered access, while Russia has escalated restrictions on VPNs and foreign services step by step.

National intranets and blocking: what changes for ordinary users

A national intranet is a domestic network of local services that can keep working even when the connection to the global internet is restricted or cut. For authorities, that makes shutdowns less costly: banks, government portals, and local apps can stay up while foreign sites disappear.

For ordinary users, the effects are practical and uneven:

  • Access becomes conditional. In Iran, our coverage of the Internet Pro system and the rise of digital feudalism explains how access to the wider internet is being framed as a privilege rather than a right, following a lengthy blackout.
  • Blocking escalates over time. In Russia, restrictions on services such as Telegram and on VPN use have tightened, as detailed in our look at Russia's VPN crackdown.
  • Domestic alternatives get a push. When foreign platforms are throttled, people are nudged toward local services that are easier for the state to monitor.

This is a form of internet censorship that works less through single banned websites and more through restructuring the network itself.

Which circumvention tools still work, and what they risk

No single tool is guaranteed to work in either country, and conditions change quickly. What can be said in general is how the contest works. Censors try to detect and block VPN traffic, and circumvention tools try to avoid detection. The main technique here is obfuscation, which disguises encrypted traffic so it resembles ordinary web traffic and is harder to identify.

Obfuscation helps with detection, but it does not remove other risks:

  • Legal exposure. Rules on VPN use and on accessing blocked content vary and are tightening. Readers inside these countries should understand local law before relying on any tool.
  • Device and account risk. Authorities may inspect phones or monitor accounts, so a working tunnel does not protect against what is stored on a device.
  • Unreliable connections. Tools that work one week may be blocked the next, and relying on a single method can leave users cut off at critical moments.
  • Trust. Free or unvetted tools can be unsafe, and anyone choosing software in a high-risk setting should look for independent audits and a record of working under censorship.

How Iran and Russia compare with China's model

China built its system over decades and enforces it with sustained pressure, including predictable tightening around sensitive dates, as described in our piece on Beijing's June 4 VPN crackdown. Its model shows that determined users keep finding workarounds, and that authorities keep adapting in response.

Iran and Russia appear to be moving toward the same destination from different directions. Iran's approach, as reported, emphasizes tiered access and the ability to isolate the population for long stretches. Russia's emphasizes progressive blocking of VPNs and foreign platforms. Both rely on the same underlying logic: control the gateways, offer sanctioned domestic options, and make unsanctioned access harder and riskier.

What This Means For You

If you live outside these countries, this trend is a warning about how quickly internet access can change, and a reminder that open connectivity is not guaranteed. If you have family, colleagues, or sources inside Iran or Russia, expect unreliable communication and plan alternative contact methods in advance.

If you live in or travel to either country, the stakes are more immediate. Prepare before you arrive or before restrictions tighten: tools are often easier to install while the wider internet is still reachable. Keep more than one option available, and be realistic about legal and personal risk.

Key takeaways

  • The Iran Russia Great Firewall copycat trend centers on national control of gateways, limits on VPNs and foreign platforms, and support for domestic services.
  • Obfuscation helps circumvention tools avoid detection, but it cannot remove legal or device-level risk.
  • Do not rely on one tool; conditions change fast.
  • Check local law and choose tools with a credible, independent track record.

For country-specific detail, read our coverage of Iran's Internet Pro system and Russia's VPN crackdown, and see our obfuscation glossary entry to understand how circumvention tools try to evade detection.